“There is no magic money tree,” as Theresa May put it during the snap election of 2017

Tiens, c'est de là que ça vient le «il n'y a pas d'argent magique» de Macron.

Before long, the Bank of England (the British equivalent of the Federal Reserve, whose economists are most free to speak their minds since they are not formally part of the government) rolled out an elaborate official report called “Money Creation in the Modern Economy,” replete with videos and animations, making the same point: existing economics textbooks, and particularly the reigning monetarist orthodoxy, are wrong. The heterodox economists are right. Private banks create money. Central banks like the Bank of England create money as well, but monetarists are entirely wrong to insist that their proper function is to control the money supply. In fact, central banks do not in any sense control the money supply; their main function is to set the interest rate—to determine how much private banks can charge for the money they create. Almost all public debate on these subjects is therefore based on false premises. […] Back in the UK, the immediate media response was simply silence. The Bank of England report has never, to my knowledge, been so much as mentioned on the BBC or any other TV news outlet. Newspaper columnists continued to write as if monetarism was self-evidently correct. Politicians continued to be grilled about where they would find the cash for social programs. It was as if a kind of entente cordiale had been established, in which the technocrats would be allowed to live in one theoretical universe, while politicians and news commentators would continue to exist in an entirely different one.

C'est tellement ça!

Robert Skidelsky's Money and Government: The Past and Future of Economics

=> je le rajoute à ma liste de livres à lire.

To put it bluntly: QTM is obviously wrong. Doubling the amount of gold in a country will have no effect on the price of cheese if you give all the gold to rich people and they just bury it in their yards, or use it to make gold-plated submarines (this is, incidentally, why quantitative easing, the strategy of buying long-term government bonds to put money into circulation, did not work either). What actually matters is spending.

In England, the pattern was set in 1696, just after the creation of the Bank of England, with an argument over wartime inflation between Treasury Secretary William Lowndes, Sir Isaac Newton (then warden of the mint), and the philosopher John Locke. Newton had agreed with the Treasury that silver coins had to be officially devalued to prevent a deflationary collapse; Locke took an extreme monetarist position, arguing that the government should be limited to guaranteeing the value of property (including coins) and that tinkering would confuse investors and defraud creditors. Locke won. The result was deflationary collapse. A sharp tightening of the money supply created an abrupt economic contraction that threw hundreds of thousands out of work and created mass penury, riots, and hunger. The government quickly moved to moderate the policy (first by allowing banks to monetize government war debts in the form of bank notes, and eventually by moving off the silver standard entirely), but in its official rhetoric, Locke’s small-government, pro-creditor, hard-money ideology became the grounds of all further political debate.

According to Skidelsky, the pattern was to repeat itself again and again, in 1797, the 1840s, the 1890s, and, ultimately, the late 1970s and early 1980s, with Thatcher and Reagan’s (in each case brief) adoption of monetarism. Always we see the same sequence of events:
(1) The government adopts hard-money policies as a matter of principle.
(2) Disaster ensues.
(3) The government quietly abandons hard-money policies.
(4) The economy recovers.
(5) Hard-money philosophy nonetheless becomes, or is reinforced as, simple universal common sense.

Ever since Hume, economists have distinguished between the short-run and the long-run effects of economic change, including the effects of policy interventions. The distinction has served to protect the theory of equilibrium, by enabling it to be stated in a form which took some account of reality. In economics, the short-run now typically stands for the period during which a market (or an economy of markets) temporarily deviates from its long-term equilibrium position under the impact of some “shock,” like a pendulum temporarily dislodged from a position of rest. This way of thinking suggests that governments should leave it to markets to discover their natural equilibrium positions. Government interventions to “correct” deviations will only add extra layers of delusion to the original one.

There is a logical flaw to any such theory: there’s no possible way to disprove it. The premise that markets will always right themselves in the end can only be tested if one has a commonly agreed definition of when the “end” is; but for economists, that definition turns out to be “however long it takes to reach a point where I can say the economy has returned to equilibrium.” (In the same way, statements like “the barbarians always win in the end” or “truth always prevails” cannot be proved wrong, since in practice they just mean “whenever barbarians win, or truth prevails, I shall declare the story over.”)

In fact, there’s absolutely no reason a modern state should fund itself primarily by appropriating a proportion of each citizen’s earnings. There are plenty of other ways to go about it. Many—such as land, wealth, commercial, or consumer taxes (any of which can be made more or less progressive)—are considerably more efficient, since creating a bureaucratic apparatus capable of monitoring citizens’ personal affairs to the degree required by an income tax system is itself enormously expensive. But this misses the real point: income tax is supposed to be intrusive and exasperating. It is meant to feel at least a little bit unfair. Like so much of classical liberalism (and contemporary neoliberalism), it is an ingenious political sleight of hand—an expansion of the bureaucratic state that also allows its leaders to pretend to advocate for small government.

C'est une réflexion intéressante sur l'impôt sur le revenu.

The one major exception to this pattern was the mid-twentieth century, what has come to be remembered as the Keynesian age. It was a period in which those running capitalist democracies, spooked by the Russian Revolution and the prospect of the mass rebellion of their own working classes, allowed unprecedented levels of redistribution—which, in turn, led to the most generalized material prosperity in human history. The story of the Keynesian revolution of the 1930s, and the neoclassical counterrevolution of the 1970s, has been told innumerable times, but Skidelsky gives the reader a fresh sense of the underlying conflict.

The counterrevolutionaries, starting with Keynes’s old rival Friedrich Hayek at the LSE and the various luminaries who joined him in the Mont Pelerin Society, took aim directly at this notion that national economies are anything more than the sum of their parts. Politically, Skidelsky notes, this was due to a hostility to the very idea of statecraft (and, in a broader sense, of any collective good). National economies could indeed be reduced to the aggregate effect of millions of individual decisions, and, therefore, every element of macroeconomics had to be systematically “micro-founded.”

One reason this was such a radical position was that it was taken at exactly the same moment that microeconomics itself was completing a profound transformation—one that had begun with the marginal revolution of the late nineteenth century—from a technique for understanding how those operating on the market make decisions to a general philosophy of human life. It was able to do so, remarkably enough, by proposing a series of assumptions that even economists themselves were happy to admit were not really true: let us posit, they said, purely rational actors motivated exclusively by self-interest, who know exactly what they want and never change their minds, and have complete access to all relevant pricing information. This allowed them to make precise, predictive equations of exactly how individuals should be expected to act.

Surely there’s nothing wrong with creating simplified models. Arguably, this is how any science of human affairs has to proceed. But an empirical science then goes on to test those models against what people actually do, and adjust them accordingly. This is precisely what economists did not do. Instead, they discovered that, if one encased those models in mathematical formulae completely impenetrable to the noninitiate, it would be possible to create a universe in which those premises could never be refuted. (“All actors are engaged in the maximization of utility. What is utility? Whatever it is that an actor appears to be maximizing.”) The mathematical equations allowed economists to plausibly claim theirs was the only branch of social theory that had advanced to anything like a predictive science (even if most of their successful predictions were of the behavior of people who had themselves been trained in economic theory).

Here they were able to take advantage of certain undeniable weaknesses in Keynesian formulations, above all its inability to explain 1970s stagflation, to brush away the remaining Keynesian superstructure and return to the same hard-money, small-government policies that had been dominant in the nineteenth century. The familiar pattern ensued. Monetarism didn’t work; in the UK and then the US, such policies were quickly abandoned. But ideologically, the intervention was so effective that even when “new Keynesians” like Joseph Stiglitz or Paul Krugman returned to dominate the argument about macroeconomics, they still felt obliged to maintain the new microfoundations.

There is a paradox here. On the one hand, the theory says that there is no point in trying to profit from speculation, because shares are always correctly priced and their movements cannot be predicted. But on the other hand, if investors did not try to profit, the market would not be efficient because there would be no self-correcting mechanism…. 

Secondly, if shares are always correctly priced, bubbles and crises cannot be generated by the market….

This attitude leached into policy: “government officials, starting with [Federal Reserve Chairman] Alan Greenspan, were unwilling to burst the bubble precisely because they were unwilling to even judge that it was a bubble.” The EMH made the identification of bubbles impossible because it ruled them out a priori.

At this point, we have come full circle. After such a catastrophic embarrassment, orthodox economists fell back on their strong suit—academic politics and institutional power. In the UK, one of the first moves of the new Conservative-Liberal Democratic Coalition in 2010 was to reform the higher education system by tripling tuition and instituting an American-style regime of student loans. Common sense might have suggested that if the education system was performing successfully (for all its foibles, the British university system was considered one of the best in the world), while the financial system was operating so badly that it had nearly destroyed the global economy, the sensible thing might be to reform the financial system to be a bit more like the educational system, rather than the other way around. An aggressive effort to do the opposite could only be an ideological move. It was a full-on assault on the very idea that knowledge could be anything other than an economic good.

Even at the height of the eventual recovery, in the fifth-richest country in the world, something like one British citizen in twelve experienced hunger, up to and including going entire days without food. If an “economy” is to be defined as the means by which a human population provides itself with its material needs, the British economy is increasingly dysfunctional.

Economic theory as it exists increasingly resembles a shed full of broken tools. This is not to say there are no useful insights here, but fundamentally the existing discipline is designed to solve another century’s problems. The problem of how to determine the optimal distribution of work and resources to create high levels of economic growth is simply not the same problem we are now facing: i.e., how to deal with increasing technological productivity, decreasing real demand for labor, and the effective management of care work, without also destroying the Earth. This demands a different science. The “microfoundations” of current economics are precisely what is standing in the way of this. Any new, viable science will either have to draw on the accumulated knowledge of feminism, behavioral economics, psychology, and even anthropology to come up with theories based on how people actually behave, or once again embrace the notion of emergent levels of complexity—or, most likely, both.

<3

Le contraste est absolument incroyable !

via : https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2013/02/REKACEWICZ/48733 qui est l'article principal sur le sujet.

Une réponse argumentée à la propagande néolibérale du «regardez il n'y a pas de problème avec le capitalisme et le néolibéralisme, puisqu'il n'y a jamais eu aussi peu de pauvreté dans le monde».

I simply pointed out that we cannot ignore the fact that the period 1820 to circa 1950 was one of violent dispossession across much of the global South. If you have read any colonial history, you will know colonizers had immense difficulty getting people to work on their mines and plantations. As it turns out, people tended to prefer their subsistence lifestyles, and wages were not high enough to induce them to leave. Colonizers had to coerce people into the labour market: imposing taxes, enclosing commons and constraining access to food, or just outright forcing people off their land. […]

The process of forcibly integrating colonized peoples into the capitalist labour system caused widespread dislocation (a history I cover in The Divide). Remember, this is the period of the Belgian labour system in the Congo, which so upended local economies that 10 million people died – half the population. This is the period of the Natives Land Act in South Africa, which dispossessed the country’s black population of 90% of the country. This is the period of the famines in India, where 30 million died needlessly as a result of policies the British imposed on Indian agriculture. This is the period of the Opium Wars in China and the unequal treaties that immiserated the population. And don’t forget: all of this was conducted in the name of the “free market”.

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The narrative that you and Gates peddle relies on a poverty line of $1.90 per day. You are aware, I’m sure, that this line is not a neutral phenomenon, handed down by the gods or given in nature. It was invented by people, is used for particular ends, and is hotly contested both inside and outside of academia. Most scholars regard $1.90 as far too low to be meaningful […]

Here are a few points to keep in mind. Using the $1.90 line shows that only 700 million people live in poverty. But note that the UN’s FAO says that 815 million people do not have enough calories to sustain even “minimal” human activity. 1.5 billion are food insecure, and do not have enough calories to sustain “normal” human activity. And 2.1 billion suffer from malnutrition. How can there be fewer poor people than hungry and malnourished people? If $1.90 is inadequate to achieve basic nutrition and sustain normal human activity, then it’s too low – period. […]

Remember: $1.90 is the equivalent of what that amount of money could buy in the US in 2011. The economist David Woodward once calculated that to live at this level (in an earlier base year) would be like 35 people trying to survive in Britain “on a single minimum wage, with no benefits of any kind, no gifts, borrowing, scavenging, begging or savings to draw on (since these are all included as ‘income’ in poverty calculations).” That goes beyond any definition of “extreme”. It is patently absurd. It is an insult to humanity.

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But what’s really at stake here for you, as your letter reveals, is the free-market narrative that you have constructed. Your argument is that neoliberal capitalism is responsible for driving the most substantial gains against poverty. This claim is intellectually dishonest, and unsupported by facts. Here’s why:
The vast majority of gains against poverty have happened in one region: East Asia. As it happens, the economic success of China and the East Asian tigers […] is due not to the neoliberal markets that you espouse but rather state-led industrial policy, protectionism and regulation (the same measures that Western nations used to such great effect during their own period of industrial consolidation). […]

Not so for the rest of the global South. Indeed, these policy options were systematically denied to them, and destroyed where they already existed. From 1980 to 2000, the IMF and World Bank imposed brutal structural adjustment programs that did exactly the opposite: slashing tariffs, subsidies, social spending and capital controls while reversing land reforms and privatizing public assets – all in the face of massive public resistance. During this period, the number of people in poverty outside China increased […] from 62% to 68%.

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Since 2000, the most impressive gains against poverty (outside of East Asia) have come from Latin America, according to the World Bank, coinciding with a series of left-wing or social democratic governments that came to power across the continent. Whatever one might say about these governments (I have my own critiques), this doesn’t sit very well with your neoliberal narrative.

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Here’s how well it’s working: on our existing trajectory, according to research published in the World Economic Review, it will take more than 100 years to end poverty at $1.90/day, and over 200 years to end it at $7.4/day. Let that sink in. And to get there with the existing system – in other words, without a fairer distribution of income – we will have to grow the global economy to 175 times its present size.

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In your work you have invoked gains in life expectancy and education as part of a narrative that seeks to justify neoliberal globalization. But here again that’s intellectually dishonest. What contributes most to improvements in life expectancy is in fact simple public health interventions (sanitation, antibiotics, vaccines), and what matters for education is, well, public education. Indeed, the countries that have been most successful at this are those that have robust, free healthcare and education. Don’t forget that the US has worse infant mortality than Cuba.

Bref, il m'a donné envie de lire son bouquin ! xD

Un article vraiment intéressant sur les sous-jacents économiques et historiques de la crise au Venezuela.

L’opération est simple. Imaginons un importateur qui dispose d’un réseau lui permettant d’acheter des bouteilles d’eau à 10 centimes de dollar pièce. Il obtient de l’État des dollars pour en acheter un million qu’il déclare payer 20 centimes pièce par le biais d’une entreprise qu’il aura préalablement créée en dehors du pays. Résultat : l’entrepreneur dispose de 100 000 dollars, qu’il peut écouler sur le marché noir local ou faire sortir du pays. « La culbute est parfois réalisée avant même la distribution du produit, poursuit M. Porras. De sorte que certains importateurs abandonnent les produits dans les hangars, ne vendant que de quoi acheter de nouveaux dollars. » Entre 2002 et 2012, la valeur des importations quintuple, passant d’environ 10 milliards de dollars à 50, un bond bien plus rapide que celui de leur volume.

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l tente de limiter les dépenses, notamment en introduisant un double taux de change : un premier, préférentiel, pour les importations jugées stratégiques ; un autre, plus élevé, pour le reste. L’idée n’était pas mauvaise, mais sa mise en œuvre aurait gagné à être précédée d’une analyse des « perturbations » qu’elle avait engendrées dans le passé. Car des dispositifs similaires avaient été instaurés dans les années 1980 puis 1990, avec chaque fois une même conséquence : l’essor de la corruption. Qu’on en juge. En 2016, le Venezuela affiche un taux de change préférentiel de 10 bolivars par dollar et un autre de 657. Obtenir un accès (légal ou non) à la manne du dollar préférentiel pour alimenter le marché courant assure donc un taux de profit stratosphérique de 6 500 %. Que l’on revende ses dollars sur le marché parallèle, et le taux de profit taquine les… 18 000 %. On fait naître des vocations de brigand au moyen de chiffres beaucoup moins élevés.

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Le 11 novembre dernier [2016 NdS], dans le quartier de La Pastora, à Caracas, on pouvait ainsi se procurer un gros panier d’aliments (quatre kilos de farine de maïs, deux kilos de riz, deux paquets de pâtes, deux pots de beurre, un litre d’huile, un sachet de lait en poudre et un kilo de sucre) pour 2 660 bolivars. Un prix aussi bas offre la perspective de gains importants sur le marché noir… où finit donc une partie des produits.

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Quid de l’autre grande réussite chaviste, l’approfondissement de la démocratie ? Militant du mouvement social « depuis toujours », M. Andrés Antillano estime que celle-ci « n’était pas seulement un étendard pour Chávez. Elle a toujours été un moyen de mobiliser, de politiser la population ». « Je n’avais jamais vraiment cru aux vertus des élections, confesse-t-il. Mais ici, elles étaient devenues un outil subversif, une force révolutionnaire. » « Étaient » ?

En 2016, l’opposition parvient à dépasser ses (innombrables) divisions pour demander l’organisation d’un référendum révocatoire, permise par la Constitution de 1999[…]. Mais depuis, gouvernement et pouvoir judiciaire […] jonchent le parcours d’obstacles frisant parfois le ridicule […]. En procédant de la sorte, « Maduro ne prive pas uniquement l’opposition de référendum, observe M. Antillano. Il nous ôte, à nous la gauche, l’un des instruments-clés du chavisme : la démocratie ».

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Tout le problème de la gauche avec la démocratie, résumé en trois phrases :

« Je sais qu’à bien des égards on peut décrire le gouvernement comme contre-révolutionnaire. Mais, pour moi, la gauche critique qui appelle au référendum fait le jeu de la droite. Car si l’opposition gagne, qu’est-ce qu’on fait ? Est-ce que les gens se rendent compte de ce qu’ils nous préparent ? »

Mais c'est un problème plus général à la démocratie représentative, aussi appelée «démocratie libérale» : elle est, par essence, un moyen de priver le peuple de son pouvoir en le mettant dans les mains de «représentants» qui bien souvent ne représentent que les dominants.

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« Tout n’est pas écrit, renchérit Mme Jimenez Lemon. Les communes offrent un moyen d’approfondir la démocratie, de débureaucratiser l’État et de développer la production. » Plaidoyer pro domo ? Non. À gauche, on imagine rarement une sortie positive de la crise actuelle sans renforcement de ce dispositif, créé par Chávez à la fin de sa vie. Seulement voilà : l’ancien président « était comme un révolutionnaire au sein de son propre gouvernement, explique l’ancienne ministre Oly Millán Campos. Il pouvait prendre des décisions allant à l’encontre des intérêts de l’appareil d’État. Sans lui, les communes se heurtent à la résistance des hauts fonctionnaires : pourquoi renforceraient-ils des structures imaginées dans l’optique de les affaiblir, puis de les remplacer ? ».
En 2004, Chávez avait décidé d’organiser le référendum révocatoire qu’exigeait l’opposition en dépit de fraudes avérées. Procéder de la sorte aujourd’hui imposerait-il au chavisme une cure d’opposition ? Pas nécessairement. Une défaite lors d’un référendum organisé en 2016 aurait conduit à de nouvelles élections. En d’autres termes, elle aurait pu offrir à la gauche vénézuélienne ce dont elle semble avoir le plus besoin : une période d’autocritique permettant de sortir des raisonnements tactiques pour penser à nouveau en termes stratégiques. Cette période aurait peut-être permis au chavisme critique de faire entendre sa voix.

Mais encore eût-il fallu que le pouvoir accepte de prêter l’oreille. À la fin de l’année 2015, l’organisation chaviste Marea socialista a souhaité procéder à son inscription au registre des partis politiques du pays. Fin de non-recevoir du CNE, qui a estimé, sans rire, que le nom de la formation « ne faisait pas » parti politique. De son côté, un procureur a jugé qu’elle ne pouvait pas se réclamer du socialisme… puisqu’elle critiquait le gouvernement. « Le gouvernement discute actuellement avec l’opposition, avec le Vatican et avec l’ambassade américaine, mais avec nous, la gauche critique, il refuse le dialogue », s’amuse un militant de Marea socialista.

Dans les rangs du chavisme, la bataille fait donc rage, dans un vacarme d’autant plus stérile qu’il n’existe plus de lieu de discussion structuré. D’un côté, les partisans du pouvoir sont de plus en plus discrets. D’un autre, un courant ancré dans la population critique les dirigeants actuels, mais considère que la lutte ne peut avoir lieu en dehors du PSUV, sauf à remettre les clés du pouvoir à la droite. Enfin, un dernier courant, dépourvu de véritable base sociale, regroupe de nombreux anciens ministres, très actifs sur les réseaux sociaux. Ils estiment avec M. Gómez que l’actuelle bureaucratie « constitue une nouvelle bourgeoisie, tout aussi rapace que la précédente et désormais en concurrence avec elle ».

Cette guerre intestine ravit la droite, qui souhaite détruire l’espoir auquel Chávez avait donné naissance. Elle enchante également les nouveaux oligarques en chemise rouge, lesquels rêvent de transformer la lutte de classes qui les a portés au pouvoir en vulgaire lutte de camps. S’ils devaient l’emporter, les innombrables « perturbations » auxquelles le chavisme n’a pas su répondre auraient assurément enfanté la catastrophe.

Une citation que je trouve excellente en toute fin d'article) :

« Faire de la politique, c’est faire avec la matière passionnelle qu’offre la conjoncture — car il n’y en a pas d’autre. »

À propos des frontières :

L’humanité se distribue en ensembles finis distincts. Et le principe de la distinction s’appelle une frontière. La frontière est donc un fait positif (maintenant je me mets même à douter qu’on comprenne correctement ce que veut dire ici « positif »…). La question « oui ou non », « pour ou contre », n’a rigoureusement aucun intérêt. La seule question intéressante, c’est celle de la forme. […]
Relisons par exemple Robespierre et la définition de la citoyenneté française donnée par la Constitution de 1793 : « Tout homme né et domicilié en France, âgé de vingt et un ans accomplis ; tout étranger âgé de vingt et un ans accomplis qui, domicilié en France depuis une année, y vit de son travail, ou acquiert une propriété, ou épouse une Française, ou adopte un enfant, ou nourrit un vieillard ; tout étranger enfin qui sera jugé par le Corps législatif avoir bien mérité de l’humanité, est admis à l’exercice des droits de citoyen français ». Des droits « de citoyen français ». Pas « du monde », cette autre navrance de l’humanisme postural. L’idée de frontière se trouve-t-elle ici abandonnée ? Nullement : elle est élaborée. D’une manière qu’on pourrait même trouver assez admirable. C’est quand même d’un autre niveau que les slogans « pour ou contre » ou « No Border ». La frontière peut donc parfaitement se penser sous l’espèce de la porosité. Mais d’une porosité nécessairement organisée : institutionnalisée.

Et sinon c'est du Lordon, donc ça troll sec :

• • Question : Votre dernier article a agité le petit monde militant.
  • Réponse de Lordon : Je ne sais pas si la tempête a concerné un dé à coudre ou jusqu’à un bol de soupe, mais à l’évidence il y a eu « quelque chose ». Mais quoi exactement ?

• Il y a quand même un stade d’extravagance herméneutique où l’on se prend à douter que les mots « lire » et « lecture » fassent l’objet d’une définition partagée.

• tout ça pour tenter de sauver Benoît-6%-Hamon

• la lutte contre le FN a de ces géométries variables que la géométrie ignore